Not All Connections Are Equal: How Firms Navigate Environmental Enforcement in China

In this guest post, Wenya Zhang and Jing Vivian Zhan discuss research and findings of their recent article in Environmental Politics – Political embeddedness and corporate strategies in environmental enforcement: evidence from China

Politically connected firms get better treatment from regulators. That’s the conventional wisdom, and it’s often right. But it misses an important point: not all connections work the same way or at the same stage of enforcement.

Consider two state-owned mining companies, both in a heavily polluting industry amid China’s environmental crackdown.

The first received a warning twenty days before an officially unannounced inspection. That gave it enough time to find a leaking tailings facility and temporarily conceal the problem before inspectors arrived. No violation was recorded, and no fine was issued. The firm was later recognized as a model of cleaner production.

The second expanded its capacity without local approvals and repeatedly resisted orders to correct its violations. Local authorities eventually suspended its production. But it belonged to a powerful central-government conglomerate. Its chairman lobbied senior provincial leaders, who contacted the municipal government on the firm’s behalf. Within four weeks, the suspension was lifted, even though the violations had barely changed.

Both firms were state-owned, both were heavy polluters, and both escaped sanctions under the same environmental crackdown. They did it in completely different ways. The first moved quietly, before any violation went on record. The second mobilized upper-tier support after formal enforcement had started.

Why the difference? Our research suggests the answer isn’t whether a firm is politically connected, but where it is embedded in the Party-state. The level of government it’s linked to and its proximity to frontline regulators shape when and how it influences enforcement.

Beyond personal ties: political embeddedness

Research on regulatory capture has shown that politically connected firms tend to receive more lenient treatment. Much of this research, however, focuses on personal relationships between executives and officials rooted in friendships, family ties, shared work histories, or corrupt exchanges. It also tends to examine enforcement after violations are identified.

These approaches overlook the durable, organisational relationships connecting firms to different levels of government. We therefore draw on the concept of political embeddedness to capture these institutional linkages. Political embeddedness can arise through state ownership, public-private partnerships, formal business associations, and other institutional arrangements. Unlike personal connections that may disappear when an official or business executive changes jobs, these relationships are anchored in organizations and can survive personnel turnover.

In a multi-tier governance system, the location of these linkages matters. We distinguish two forms. Local embeddedness means horizontal linkages to the authorities responsible for day-to-day enforcement. Upper-tier embeddedness means upward linkages to higher authorities that can oversee or influence local regulators.

Our argument is straightforward. Local embeddedness gives firms early access to inside information and resources, enabling them to preempt enforcement before violations are formally recorded. Upper-tier embeddedness provides leverage over local authorities, enabling top-down intervention after enforcement has begun. Firms with neither must build linkages to access regulatory protection.

What we found

We develop this argument through comparative case studies of ten mining enterprises in Shandong, Shanxi, Guangdong and Hainan Provinces, drawing on fieldwork in 2023–24 and interviews with 69 company executives, employees and government officials. We operationalize political embeddedness through state ownership and compare three groups: local state-owned enterprises (SOEs), central or provincial SOEs, and non-SOEs.

Local embeddedness: influence before enforcement

Local SOEs are deeply embedded in local political and bureaucratic structures. Their senior managers may be appointed by local authorities, while the firms provide employment, fiscal revenue, infrastructure, and social services. As a result, they were invited to government meetings, visited by mayors, and enlisted to deliver local policy goals.

These routine exchanges produced something extremely valuable: advance notice, anticipatory guidance, and room to negotiate. One firm used a mayoral visit to secure a roughly three-month postponement of an inspection of its high-emission facilities, which gave it time to upgrade its pollution controls at its own pace. Another bargained its role as a policy-implementing SOE to obtain government-funded consulting and a 15% investment subsidy. In none of these cases did a violation reach the formal record.

These cases show how local embeddedness can prevent environmental problems from becoming formal enforcement cases. Corporate influence does not necessarily appear as an official canceling a fine. It may take the less visible form of advance warning, administrative assistance, or negotiated inspection timing.

Upper-tier embeddedness: intervention after detection

Central and provincial SOEs are often “outsiders” (wailaihu) in local politics. Their higher administrative rank does not necessarily give them leverage over frontline regulators or prevent violations from being detected. Instead, it gives firms channels to contest, mitigate, or reverse sanctions afterward.

A provincial coal SOE was caught discharging untreated wastewater and excessive coal dust. It faced a fine of over RMB 200,000, partial suspension, and public disclosure. Provincial agencies intervened, stressing its importance to “regional energy security and fiscal stability”. Local regulators subsequently replaced the planned sanctions with a rectification order with a suspended penalty. Another gold-mining SOE used a minority bureaucratic shareholder, a provincial geological bureau, as a broker. Concerned about the financial consequences of a production suspension, the bureau pressed the provincial natural resources department to relax enforcement.

No embeddedness: building institutional linkages

Private and foreign-invested enterprises lack the ownership-based linkages SOEs enjoy. Some respond by building institutional relationships through People’s Congresses, consultative bodies, business associations, and Party-building activities.

One private company’s chairman held seats on the provincial and municipal People’s Congresses and a business federation. When regulators found its pollution controls idle in 2016, he raised the matter with the municipal government before the penalty was finalized, stressing the firm’s standing as a top taxpayer and employer. A potential fine of up to RMB 200,000 became a rectification notice with zero penalty. The same firm grew its Party organization from a five-member branch to over 220 members and built a “Red Culture” exhibition hall. It then institutionalized joint Party study sessions with the Party branches of the provincial and municipal environmental agencies. These sessions became a legitimate channel for regulators to share policy information with the firm.

Why it matters

Our findings challenge authoritarian environmentalism as a uniform, top-down implementation. Central pressure has strengthened environmental enforcement but has not eliminated corporate influence. Protection has shifted toward more selective, formal, and less visible channels, such as official meetings, study sessions, and brokered mediation.

We also reveal a blind spot in studies focusing on recorded penalties. By the time a fine appears in official data, many important interactions have already occurred. Focusing only on penalties risks overlooking the routine, facilitative interactions that decide whether a violation is ever recorded. To understand how firms navigate environmental enforcement, we need to look beyond whether firms are connected. We must ask to whom they are connected, at what level of government, and at what stage of enforcement those connections become useful.

Bio

Wenya Zhang holds a PhD in Government and Public Administration from the Chinese University of Hong Kong and is currently a Lecturer at the Shenzhen Nanshan District Institute of Public Administration. Her research interests focus on environmental politics and state-business relations in China. Her work has appeared in the China Quarterly, Environmental Politics, Journal of Chinese Governance, and International Journal of Water Resources Development.

Jing Vivian Zhan is a Professor in the School of Governance & Policy Science at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. She specializes in comparative political economy, contemporary Chinese politics, local governance, and development. She examines the politics of natural resources and how mineral wealth shapes local development and governance, corruption, social conflict, redistribution, environmental regulation, and human-capital investment. She is the author of China’s Contained Resource Curse: How Minerals Shape State-Capital-Labor Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2022) and dozens of articles in journals such as The China Quarterly, Environmental Politics, Environmental and Resource Economics, Geopolitics, Policy Studies Journal, and Third World Quarterly.

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